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THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN

"The best laid plans of mice and men [often go astray]." One can only marvel at the truth in this simple statement . For centuries man has been making grand plans for better mousetraps or a better society, and invariably something turns up to upset the Plan. Of the many instances throughout history which support this, perhaps the most spectacular took place in the early years of our century. The year was 1914. All Europe was an armed camp with Germany considered the most formidable military power. Germany's reputation rested upon the achievements of its Great General Staff which had guided the nation throughout the great wars of the 19th century . The secret behind this reputation lay in prior planning , thorough military training and proper utilization of diplomacy. In 1914 the General Staff was, as always prepared for war. The guide for victory this time was to be the Schlieffen Plan. Under the guidance of Graf Alfred von Schlieffen the plan had been composed with traditional Prussian thoroughness and every aspect for achieving a decisive, quick military decision on the Western Front was considered in 12 weeks. However, one factor was overlooked amongst the mobilization charts, railroad timetables and munitions reserves, this was the human factor, which at break of the war in the summer of 1914 quickly became the German Achilles heel.

Before considering the plan in detail, it would be wise to consider why the Germans would hinge the whole fortune of war on one master plan which was supposed to win the war within 12 weeks. "The basic problem which the plan had to meet was that of a two-front war, in which Germany and her Austrian ally faced Russia on the east and France on the west - a combination whose forces were numerically superior although separated from one another."

Since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 a competitive armament race had developed amongst all the major powers on the continent. A race in which the Central Powers fell behind. A chart comparing the peace strengths of the major combatants best illustrates this:

According to the Crown Prince the only arm in which the Germans and the Austrians were superior was the Heavy Artillery.

While the Regular Army Cadres may not be of vast importance numerically, the number of trained reserves which can bring the fighting organizations quickly up to strength could well tip the balance between victory and defeat in the early battles. Throughout the last years of the 19th Century vast reserves of men with two to three years of military training were built up by most of the major powers. Here again the Central Powers were at a disadvantage. The other nations had followed Prussia's example well.

The following chart best illustrates this:

Against this advantage in numbers Germany had a centralized position, a superb Army and the Great General Staff. After 1870, Graf von Moltke, the elder, planned a defensive- offensive strategy of countering French and Russian moves aimed at crippling the enemy and bringing about a favorable peace. By the time Graf von Schlieffen became Chief of the General Staff ideas and times had changed somewhat. During his years as Chief of the General Staff Schlieffen composed his plan in which a modern Cannae would totally cripple the French Army. He believed the French could be defeated in about four weeks. This idea that the war could be won with one campaign remains the most criticized facet of the plan. Yet, in light of the German victories in 1864 over the Danes, in 1866 over the Austrians and in 1870 over the French, was a long war inevitable?

The plan as finally devised by Graf von Schlieffen in 1906 is above. Through economy of force in the east and south-west Schlieffen's plan attained a maximum concentration of combat power on the decisive right wing . Of the forces on this right wing, they comprised 83%of the total german Army and on the west front the ratio between the left and right was 1 to 8 . The northern most troops were to subdue Liege, Belgium, and descend upon the rear of this force would invest Antwerp and deal with the British Army if it landed. The second group would invade across southern Belgium, outflank the French successively until they united with the first group in the French rear. The small forces around Metz would make an early demonstration in the direction of Nancy to attract French forces. The very small forces on the Upper Rhine would encourage any French hopes of retaking Alsace and thus lead them deeper into the trap. It was hoped the French Armies would be broken against the rear of their fortress line and the Swiss Frontier. The entire operation was to take four weeks after mobilization .

Graf von Schlieffen was succeded by Graf Von Moltke, the Younger in 1906. Moltke, being a more cautious man than Schlieffen, increased the strength of the Eastern Army . Also, in the face of the possibility of the French attacking north through Luxembourg and cutting off the right wing he strengthened the left wing until the proportion fell from 1 to 8 down to 1to 3. The watered down Schlieffen Plan known as the weakened right wing (shown on the following page) became the Bible to the attacking Germans in 1914. The idea of the plan was still the same, but with reduced means.

The basic fallacy of the plan was its failure to consider the human factors involved. The first of these was the resulting disfavor of World Opinion over the breach of Belgian neutrality. Even if the invasion of the Belgium offered great initial military advantages, it was a most unhappy solution politically. Secondly, because of restrictions upon the government in regards to time needed to implement mobilization, the Diplomats did not have eternity in which to negotiate. "The outbreak of war in 1914 is the most tragic example of a government's helpless dependence on the planning of strategists that history has ever seen." The importance of the time-table robbed Germany of freedom to maneuver diplomatically.

The third element of the human ability to help decide the outcome of the plan was the heroic defense of Belgium by an Army partially composed of raw recruits. The advance through Belgium was delayed by the Fortress Liege, the destroyed railroads and bridges, and by the tiny Belgium Army. The unexpected resistance kindled German brutality. Reprisals were made against the civilians and villages were burned. Once again the world was shocked.

A fourth element was the German soldier. The broken bridges and railroads meant no supplies. The Germans had to live off of the land, which could not wholly accommodate the passing hordes. Besides hunger, Hans had to face forced marches and constant fighting, which soon led to exhaustion. By the time the Germans reached the Marne, fighting strength was down about 50%. It was discovered too late that gigantic sweep could not be supplied by the means available in 1914.

Another human factor which cost the Germans dearly was the compatibility of the field commanders. As the Field Armies moved farther from OHL (Supreme Headquarters)co-operation relaxed, especially between Kluck and Bulow the commanders of the right wing. The improper co-ordination was the leading factor which caused the German defeat at the Marne.

The last four paragraphs have sought to emphasize the importance of the human factor upon the outcome of the Schlieffen plan. The Plan, which was brilliant in concept and caught the French completely off guard, simply was too much of a gamble in 1914. Supply and Communication for such an operation would not be possible until World War II. The drain of manpower from the right wing was very crucial, as was the command situation. But perhaps the outstanding human factor was the French elan which "just when it is on the point of being Extinguished ," flamed up miraculously. General von Kluck, commander of the German 1st Army said it best: "The reason that transcends all others was extraordinary and peculiar aptitude of the French soldier to recover quickly. That men will let themselves be killed where they stand, that is a well-known thing and counted on in every plan of battle. But that men who have retreated for ten days, sleeping on the ground and half dead with fatigue, should be able to take up their rifles and attack when the bugle sounds, is a thing upon which we never counted. It was a possibility not studied in our war academy."